Progress: Security Services

Neoliberal Chickens Come Home to Roost in a Coup

Spurred on by Mr Chris Finlayson's diatribe about the relative backstabbyness of Labour ... (which seemed rather curious coming from a member of the party in possession of the 2nd-most-pockmarked-set-of-collective-shoulder-blades in Kiwi politics after ACT) ... it occurred that there seems to be a pretty axiomatic correlation between how right-wing/neoliberal a party is and its relative level of internal disunity/coup-preponderance/outright civil war.

So, ACT is clearly at the extreme neoliberal/unstable end of this spectrum - both politically/economically and in terms of internal turmoil (the precise details of this clusterfuck from about 2002 onward being pretty well known, but memorably featuring the Nat-backed ouster of Hide by Brash, the earlier Roy-attempt at Hide, the full-blown civil war which accompanied that, ongoing (and very public) criticism from Roger Douglas of Hide's vibe, various rumblings against Richard Prebble ... and so on and so forth), these guys really are the apex and eminent case-study of the linkage between neoliberal vibes and flawed/tumultuous internal structures.

Then there's the Nats. Won't go into the details (there's seven decades' worth to countenance, with it getting particularly bad following the end of Muldoon), but it seems like the Born to Rule party is in an almost perpetual state of squabble about who, exactly, was born to rule whom. Memorable examples include attempted uprisings against Muldoon, the neoliberal plot against Jim Bolger which produced Shipley, the ouster of first Shipley and then her successor, English; and then in a fit of revenge, English leaking a whole lot of emails in order to torpedo Brash, thus leading to Key. And from Key unto either Collins or Joyce but they haven't finished duking that out yet.
What the National Party's vicissitudinal internal fortunes betray is that the more neoliberal a party gets, the more volatile its internal situation becomes.

Following on from this is the Maori Party. A Caucus of 3 MPs of which 2 are Leaders doesn't leave much scope for leadership squabbles I would ahve thought ... but apparently not. Again. They furthered a neoliberal agenda in concert with the Nats, and found themselves with first a Hone- and then a more generalized leadership problem.

Somewhere in the middle, we have the Labour Party. Mr Finlayson is correct to note that there do seem to be quite a few white ants in amidst the red ones, with specific dishonourable mentions including everybody subsequent to David Lange (seriously - how many leaders did they have between Lange and Clark, and for how long?), and a humourous side-note for Phil Goff's attempted "Chicken-Coup" of Helen Clark in the mid-1990s. Once again, there is a clear pattern. As teh party found itself becoming one of the underpinnings of our neoliberal paradigmatic consensus, its internal volatility increased. Up till the Clark years, at any rate. Quasi-social-democracy and winning elections is apparently something of a salve in this regard 

Now at the complete opposite anti-Neoliberal/relatively stable end of the spectrum, we have The Greens and NZ First.

I'm going to chuck the Greens down first, for two main reasons: Mike Ward (former Co-Leader of the forerunner Values Party) and Nandor Tanczos. Admittedly it wasn't a traditional sort of leadership squabble, as the previous incumbent had quite literally died in office, but either way there was a contest, somebody wound up having to stand aside, and in addition to losing two well-recognized Parliamentarians, Mr Ward had to be lent on in order to be made to give up his entitlement to enter Parliament as next on their List. Clearly, "sustainable" economics is not negatively correlated with a sustainable interior position.

Anyway. I know I'm frenetically biased as all hell, but I'm chucking down NZ First last. As both the most stable (for the last decade and a half, at least) and arguably the most anti-neoliberal of the main parties. The only time we've had a leadership coup ... it was back in 1998, and was an arguable result of getting *much too close* to the whole neoliberalist vibe. And never was Tau Henare to darken our doorstep again. (The resultant Mauri-Pacific party failed even harder than the present Maori Party combined with Taito Philip Field's NZ Pacific party) Ever since then, we've been remarkably stable. *quickly runs to check history of Yugoslavia*

So yeah. There's my response to Chris Finalyson's "Unauthorized History of the Labour Party". All six main parties ranked on a spectrum from most-volatile/neoliberalist down to least-volatile/neoliberalist. It's pretty telling that it's the same spectrum, don'tchathink?

Davoyding the issue? Never fear, ordinary Kiwis to the rescue!

Yesterday, over a hundred anti-racism advocates turned out in Christchurch to march against Kyle Chapman and his small, but pert band of white-whine enthusiasts. 

Now, the question I'm asking myself is ... what's the new Race Relations Commissioner got to say about this. 

I mean ... a group of white supremacists stages a public demonstration ... there's a rather larger counter-demonstration from persons concerned about the impact this might have on race relations in NZ ... and it's all within a few days of us having appointed a Race Relations Commissioner.

You'd think it would be an ideal sort of an occasion for an incoming RRC to make her mark with - really establish some "credentials".

I thus tried to search up what Devoy had to say about the demonstration.

Now, I can tell you right now what Joris de Bres said about the same event in the same city last year (it's the first hit on google for various combinations of "race relations commissioner", "kyle chapman" and just about anything else you can think of), but unfortunately I can't tell you what our incumbent Race Relations Commissioner thinks about white supremacists demonstrating on the streets of Christchurch.

I'd like to hazard an informed guess as to what the Race Relations Commissioner might have to say/think about Kyle Chapman attempting to pull off a 5-man chorus of "DO YOU HEAR THE (WHITE) PEOPLE SING" in the streets round St Albans ... but given what she apparently thinks about Waitangi Day, I'm really not sure I'd be anywhere close to the mark.

I'm not saying that Savoy's appointment appears to be an attempt by the government to evince the irrelevancy of the position of Race Relations Commissioner ... but I am saying that I'm bloody glad, given the present incumbent, that there's a two to one ratio of anti-racist activists to white-supremacists down in Christchurch for situations like these.

Because apparently, in the absence of a functioning Race Relations Commissioner, relying upon the principles and good conscience of your fellow Kiwi is pretty much all we've got to get by on.

Suddenly, it doesn't seem so bad.

John Key on Hekia

W(h)ither the Maori Party?

Wither the Maori party.

Sorry, that's probably a little harsh.

Whither the Maori party?

At their party conference held last month, the Maori party explored ways to rejuvenate and diversify the party’s image, support base and electoral prospects. These ranged from the fairly predictable, in the form of a remit to begin a leadership transition process for MP Te Ururoa Flavell and a renewed emphasis on running a party vote campaign; through to more surprising suggestions including a desire to substantially increase the party’s support among non-Maori.

These two goals – diversifying (some might say diluting) the party’s constituency and improving its flagging electoral prospects - are closely interlinked, and have come about as a strategic response to changes in the political terrain and the party.

The Maori party's electoral model has previously been conditioned by two elements: its mechanism for returning MPs to the House through the strong likelihood of its holding several of the Maori Seats, and the party's self-perceived function within the House as representation for Maori. This has contributed toward its initial incarnation as a fiercely partisan protest party and its more recent desire to be a (Treaty) partner in government.

It was fortunate enough to be able to fight its first two General Elections in favourable political terrain. In 2005, the recent salience of the Foreshore and Seabed issue provided a potent mobilizing force for the Maori party's target constituency. This played a strong role in establishing some of the initial populist and identity-politic appeal of the party as an independent/organic voice for Maori in a potentially unrepresentative democratic and policy process.

More importantly, as a unified opposition to Labour in the Maori seats (and representing the most successful challenger to Labour for the Maori seats since New Zealand First) the Maori party was able to capitalize upon being the only other real option for voters in these seats. It also may have gained substantially from a probable tactical elector intent of vote-splitting by giving their party vote to Labour and their electorate vote to the local Maori candidate in the belief that if the Maori party candidate were successful, the Labour candidate would also ideally make it back into Parliament on the party list. (between 2005 and 2008 this happened by my estimation five times)

The Maori party successfully parlayed these favourable conditions into 2.12% and 4 electorate seats in 2005, and a more robust 2.39% and 5 seats in 2008. These majority shares of the 7 Maori seats (with only 2 non-Maori party MPs in the seats after the 2008 election) certainly did not harm the party's effective reputation as the only game in town for being both a successful 'organic' indigenous political movement, and challenging Labour's dominance on Maori issues and perceived monopolization of Maori representation.

In 2011 however, it was different. The battle for the Maori Seats had become a three-way competition with the credible entry of the MANA party onto the scene in the Te Tai Tokerau by-election in June of that year. Further, the Labour party's effort in the seats was bolstered by having been in Opposition for the previous three years. No longer being in government meant Labour could spend less time defending its historic controversies and more time attacking the Maori party's role in government. This reversed the tables on the previous two elections, which had seen an 'outsider', independent and aggressively partisan Maori party seeking to call Labour's government to account. The Maori party's entry into governance back in 2008, by contrast, had eroded their credibility as either a protest party or an independent voice. This situation was only exacerbated by the emergence of an electoral alternative in the form of the MANA party more strongly focused on the protest element of Maori representation and which had staked out its partisan principles by defecting from both government and the Maori party.

In electoral terms then, it should hardly be surprising that the party's result declined proportionately. They had previously lost an MP and a safe seat when Hone Harawira defected prior to the Te Tai Tokerau by-election meaning they went into the 2011 general election with a Caucus of 4. On election night, they lost both Te Tai Tonga (to Labour's Rino Tirikatene) and 0.96% of their vote. Interestingly, MANA polled 1.08% of the popular vote; and, in Te Tai Tonga, just under the margin by which incumbent Maori MP Rahui Katene lost by. This leads to the obvious if somewhat unverifiable conclusion that the MANA party were directly responsible for the loss of two seats and perhaps up to a percent of popular vote for the Maori party.

It also handily demonstrates the point that competing within the Maori Seats can be something of a zero sum game. There are only 7 seats to be won, and although the Maori Party had managed to credibly organize and deliver results while these contests were substantively two party races, the addition of a third competitor has increased the investment necessary for any party to generate a return from putting effort into increasing their share of these seats.

Additionally, the strong correlation between the percentage of party votes lost by the Maori party with that gained by the MANA party may indicate that campaigning for the party vote associated with Maori representation is a situation of similar limitations and diminishing marginal returns. Although the extent of the nominal Maori electorate in terms of the return it can deliver through party vote is far more nebulous than the fixed seven seats available from the Maori electoral roll, the strong overlap between the MANA and Maori parties in rhetoric, identity politik focus and previous preferred constituencies means that they are inevitably going to be competing for many of the same party votes.

The defection of Hone Harawira before the 2011 election from the 'insider' Maori party to form his own 'outsider' protest movement represented in part a growing dissatisfaction within the Maori party's existing voter base at the conciliatory approach the party had taken toward National and the perceived erosion of the party's values which had thus ensued. The impact of MANA upon the Maori party's 2014 vote prospects then needs to be understood not just in terms of encouraging a large chunk of the party's supporters, candidates and activists and nearly half their party vote to up and leave with Harawira; but rather by the way the existence of a new, independent and fiercely partisan protest movement with an emphasis on Maori representation and Maori nationalism/identity politics directly competes for and may have delegitimated much of the Maori party's perceived strength in these areas. In effect, Harawira's defection conditioned and solidified emerging negative narratives about the Maori party (a succinct, if extreme summation of which would be Harawira's own recent "house niggers" comment, perhaps more politely phrased as "sellouts and hood-ornaments"), while also creating an alternative dedicated to those functions of protest, independence and social justice that may have been perceived to be neglected by the Maori party. This has had the strategic effect of increasing the effort and difficulty of appealing to these voters and parts of the electorate, while also forcing the Maori party to redefine its image and narrative in response.

Facing 2014 then, the Maori party has found itself faced with some stark strategic choices to make regarding its electoral future.

At its conference, it decided to defer the motion to initiate a leadership transition for Te Ururoa Flavell. This keeps its two experienced co-Leaders occupying both their positions and their winnable electorate seats for the foreseeable future, and capitalizes upon strong pre-existing electoral and representational records for both these MPs and seats. It also keeps the leadership option open for future use if a successful challenge of Sharples by Shane Jones in Tamaki Makaurau looks likely (as was nearly the case in 2011, with Jones only behind by 936 votes); or alternatively if Flavell needs a profile boost in the event of a close race for Waiariki (which, despite his appreciable margin of 1,883 votes over MANA President Annette Sykes in 2011, is possible).

Interestingly, the Maori party also expressed a desire to appeal to more non-Maori voters and supporters or even stand non-Maori candidates; which, while perhaps somewhat at odds with the party's earlier emphasis upon being a party of Maori speaking for Maori, is nevertheless a logical reaction to the increased difficulty the party is clearly faced with in pursuing its existing strategy of focusing more exclusively on attracting Maori supporters or the Maori vote. In essence, the Maori party has seen the comfortable political nieche it had previously occupied become altogether less hospitable with the addition of a direct competitor who has seized and demarcated out a swathe of it for his own. This has led to a corresponding increase in the effort which the Maori party must invest in competing with its close rivals for votes and supporters in its traditional constituencies, which has no doubt encouraged the Maori party to consider how it can appeal to electors outside these hotly contested battlegrounds as a source of members and electoral support.

One obvious way it could do this is by seeking to capitalize upon the well-developed perception that National will struggle to find "stable" coalition partners with whom they are both reasonably ideologically compatible and whose likely future Caucus composition will need more than a phonebox (or coffin) sized space to meet in.

The Maori party's strong record in governance of policy delivery and good faith partnership and negotiation - and, indeed, their strong emphasis upon being a "partner" in government - allows them to market themselves as an effective centrist party and a coalition partner for National with long-term viability. While it may be some time before we see tactical voting for the Maori party by National supporters, this role as both a prominent centrist voice and a dependable coalition partner may yet provide additional electoral appeal as they seek an increased party vote. The ideological (or at least rhetorical) heritage of the party's Caucus may also potentially allow it to work with Labour in a post-election situation, giving a party vote for the Maori party an added dimension of utility for non-Maori voters seeking an alternative centrist electoral option.

The ability and willingness of the party to brand itself as a centrist electoral option was shown by Turia's recent choice to characterize the focus of the party as being upon "housing, employment, education and whanau ora". This list of three broad-appeal goals and one prominent legacy item may serve to convey a centrist appeal with a Maori flavour rather than a Maori appeal with a centrist flavour. This de-emphasis of Maori isssues allows an avoidance of conflict with MANA in areas of shared appeal, while the focus on both the legacy item and gains in deliverable policy areas allow the Maori party to compete with rival parties from the Opposition in ways that emphasise their point of difference as a governmental 'insider' party.

The shift from goals more obviously identifiable as Maori in appeal (for example, securing recognition for the Tino Rangatiratanga flag) to those which, while they might have more importance for Maori are nevertheless of general appeal (such as improvements in "housing, employment [and] education") also plays strongly into its drive to diversify its support base and electoral prospects by recasting its role as delivering outcomes applicable to if not all New Zealanders, then at least more of them. And, if the Maori party is serious about pursuing a broader appeal and attracting voters and activists from outside of its traditional constituency, promulgating goals they can also identify with and have a stake in is important.

The Maori party's putting such a prospective focus on marketing itself in these areas can also be seen as a response to the challenges the party is facing in fostering and retaining voters and members (the number of which has reportedly slumped to 600), activists and candidates through its existing focus on the Maori electorate and electors. While this declining trend may well already have been in evidence prior to 2011, the emergence of the MANA party has exacerbated it; and, due to MANA's strong competition for these same core electors and activists, made it much harder to reverse.

The existence of MANA has also tightened the contests for both the Maori Seats and broader Maori electorate and thus worsened the situation of diminishing marginal returns which any party (particularly the presently dominant incumbent) faces in terms of having to put in ever-increasing effort for uncertain and limited electoral (indeed, somewhat 'all-or-nothing') returns. I would be honestly surprised if the Maori Party increased their share of the Maori Seats from 3 to 4 or more at the next election. Instead, they could conceivably lose one or more seats to either MANA or the Labour Party. Their ability to rely on a strong return in the Maori Seats to ensure the party's parliamentary presence remains viable and grows is thus curtailed, which leads to their understandable renewed emphasis on campaigning for the party vote in both the broader and Maori electorates.

The interesting thing about the Maori party's party vote strategy is that it generates a greater relative return the worse they do in the Maori Seats. This is because to take advantage of any gains in party vote, the Maori party's share of the vote must entitle them to more MPs than they would otherwise have gained through electorate wins. To date, this has never occurred due to the Maori party's strong returns in the Maori Seats and their comparatively weaker returns on party vote.

However, as they will have only three electoral seats going into the 2014 General Election and face the very real possibility of losing one of those, they would only have to improve their share of the party vote to about 3.3% if they hold all 3 of their existing Maori Seats to gain 1 List MP for a restored Caucus of 4. Alternatively, if they lose an electorate seat then they would only require about 2.5% of the party vote to benefit from an additional List MP to maintain in size if not exact composition their Caucus of 3. As a point of reference, the latest Roy Morgan poll had them on 3.5%, making the benefits of pursuing a party vote strategy quite obvious - whether as electoral insurance or as a means for growth.

Given the strong challenges the party now faces in appealing to its traditional constituency which looks set to contribute to a relatively stagnant or declining electoral return from the party's Maori constituency, and the consequent expanding utility of both a party vote campaign and appealing outside that constituency, the rhetoric emerging from this year's Maori party conference over these issues is entirely unsurprising.

The Maori party does not necessarily face immediate extinction; and, with its decision to continue on with its existing leadership team, it can probably be assured at least a presence in Parliament after the next election.
However, its attempts to be the 'elder statesman' of Maori politics are finding themselves undercut by the youthful vigour of the MANA party and reasonable challenges from experienced Labour campaigners.
It may well have sat down, engaged in a rational decision-making process and come to the conclusion that its prospects for attracting support or a future from a vision and focus directed more exclusively toward Maori are becoming somewhat stagnant, and that the best thing to do going forward is to parlay the party's existing prominence as a strong and stable centrist coalition partner whose Caucus have reasonable profile and respect into a broader electoral appeal.

If it is serious about this effort, it will face an additional issue in the form of heightened questions about the nature of its character, values, identity and legitimacy; particularly given the previous adverse consequences of its earlier transition of identity from 'outsider' protest party to 'insider' member of the governing establishment. 

While its supporters will no doubt be reassured that the party has decided to rebuff speculation that it might drop the word "Maori" from the name, will the Maori Party one day be Maori in name only?

From NZ First's Manifesto: Greater Use of Public Referenda

New Zealand First wants to form a practical partnership with the New Zealand people by the judicious use of direct public referenda where:there is neutrality and impartiality in the question;

-there is fair dissemination of all of the facts on both sides of the argument;

-there is certainty in the poll (i.e. the question can be clearly understood);-there is appropriate time for debate to be conducted;

-and,the referendum's objective is capable of being met within the country's fiscal constraints.

Consultation on major constitutional changes, on the ownership of assets, on important social policy, on significant economic strategies, and on New Zealand's relations with the world is fundamental to a healthy democracy.

'People power' by means of referenda should, where possible and practicable, replace MPs' conscience votes.

Binding referenda will be triggered by petitions achieving support of 10% of the electorate.

Both government and members' bills that have the support of parliament can, where stipulated, also trigger a binding referendum.

Referenda will be conducted either on the first Saturday of November each year or inconjunction with a general election.

Referenda qualifying before March 1 will be conducted in the following November to provide sufficient lead-in time.A revamped Electoral Commission provided with greater resources will conduct up to fourcitizens initiated referenda, as well as any government or parliament designated referenda each year, and will also be responsible for ensuring that balanced dissemination of all of the facts on both sides of the argument occurs in timely fashion.

A successful referendum result will be achieved by simple majority and may only be vetoed by the vote of 75% of all Members of Parliament within one calendar month of the result being declared.

Auckland's Storm Water Menace

In February 2012, following a week of severe thunderstorms in Auckland and associated reports of flash flooding, damaged properties and storm water systems not being able to cope with the deluges, I decided to pen an article for this blog. I penned it in the hope that someone would have the bravery to stand up on behalf of the Auckland Council and say, "we stuffed up and we will take responsibility for the repairs. We will take all appropriate steps to mitigate the hazard".

Perhaps my faith was misplaced. Now the Auckland Council has been found severely wanting for lack of planning to replace hundreds of kilometres of old storm water pipes, a good portion of which is corrugated iron. This problem, which has been brewing for decades, is not a new one. New or not, over the next few years - millions of dollars will have to be spent upgrading the key pipes in the network. Auckland has spent hundreds of millions of dollars trying to fix its transport system and getting the Britomart working properly. If it can invest that much so readily on railway and roads, then it can certainly spend more on the functionality of the storm water system.

In Christchurch when the then Mayor, Garry Moore suggested increasing the size of the city to 500,000 people, one of the many criticisms of his idea included sewerage and storm water pipe networks needing a thorough over haul. It was said that some of the piping was over 100 years old and struggled already to carry the volumes that were forced through it. Seismic activity on 04 September 2010, 22 February 2011, 13 June 2011 and 23 December 2012 all meant that these two vitally important networks are now getting their due overhaul.

But should it have needed an earthquake to make the Christchurch City Council wake up to its priorities? Of course not, though that is what it took.

This is an issue that should seriously bug Auckland. As a keen observer of meteorology and in particular meso-cyclonic systems such as thunderstorms, it bugs me that the city does not seem to have understood that every summer there is a high risk of at least one severe thunderstorm event passing through. These events typically bring very heavy rain at rates that might be anywhere between 25-50mm/hr. If they are slow moving systems that have popped up because of convection, one might stick around for an hour or more, which is plenty of time to cause some serious flooding. It will happen again. It might not be a severe thunderstorm either. It might be a low pressure system from the Tasman that stalls over the Auckland area and spends a day dumping its load on the city. However the next heavy rainfall event comes, the results will be similar if nothing is done.

Imagine coming home after a day at work, to find your home carpeted in mud. You go to your neighbours and find them sifting through their belongings, turfing most of them into a skip because they are no longer usable. Later that day you get a knock on the door. It's an engineer from the Council storm water unit. He has come to see how badly damaged your property is. He tells you that an elderly pipe ruptured under an influx of water it was never designed for. He further says that dozens of properties have been affected like yours.

If I were an Aucklander, who I vote for in 2013 might depend entirely on how they approach this issue - especially if a severe thunderstorm or other high intensity rainfall event floods my property so badly that it is uninhabitable.